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FEED: Are there any psychopharmacological drugs in development right now that have particularly interesting properties, or that you think will be particularly valuable to patients?

KRAMER: I think the next step on the horizon, and something that will raise some ethical issues, is the development of drugs that block the action of stress hormones in the brain. Stress hormones -- the ones related to cortisol -- are made by the adrenal gland and go through the bloodstream. But they can also act as transmitters in the brain, and they seem to change the anatomy of the brain �- they can change neural connections, and they can change the way genes are expressed in the brain. When a child at a critical stage in development is traumatized, through say child abuse or neglect or loss of a parent, what seems to happen is that there is a hyperactivation of stress hormones, which may affect the brain in a way that leads to future episodes of anxiety, depression, and so on. I think the next step in pharmacotherapy after antidepressants is going to be chemicals that block stress hormones in the brain, with some hope of a kind of pharmacological preventative psychiatry. So that someone will have a stressor but not suffer the anatomical consequences of the stress.

I think there's a difficult question here: a child loses a parent; do we want the child to experience the grieving that follows, or do we want to interrupt that process with the hope of preventing mental illness later in life? The answer would be more obvious in the case of molestation. But we may very well be faced with that kind of question soon -� it looks like drugs early in the clinical trial process do something like this or at least have the potential to do something like this. In any case I think pharmaceutical researchers are looking for substances that could act as preventative agents.

FEED: Are these drugs designed to be solely preventative, or do they treat an acute condition?

KRAMER: These drugs might be very good for adults with post-traumatic stress disorder �- I think that's the immediate hope. In an adult who has had change in stress hormone-related aspects of brain anatomy, and who is suffering psychological symptoms as a result, these drugs might offer relief and protection and a chance for the brain to heal. But I think the people developing these drugs are also well aware of their potential role prophylactically.

FEED: There's no way of knowing if a stressful event will lead to mental illness or just an unpleasant memory. So if you take these drugs you might be making your life more pleasant without actually treating a disease. Is it appropriate for drug designers to be thinking in terms of developing psychopharmacological drugs that do not treat an illness per se, but rather help people in some sub-clinical way?

KRAMER: I think this is a moral question that isn't so immediately on the table, because what generally happens is that the impetus for drug development is illness or injury. And also, most things you would want to enhance are also functions that can potentially become injured �- as in the case of Viagra, for example. Although the moral question doesn't present itself initially, it does present itself eventually in almost every case because, even if you start with a drug that treats an illness, the drug may have other effects. As a chemist you don't get a choice to work on a drug that only heals injuries. For the most part you're dealing with transmitter systems in the brain that are widely distributed. You're trying to influence those systems with a chemical and you'll only know down the road just what influencing those systems does. So it may turn out to be hard to develop substances that only treat illness without also influencing wellness in the way that I've called "cosmetic psychopharmacology."

FEED: What about the reverse -- what if you remove treatment of illness from the equation? If you know that your drug to treat an illness is going to have a lot of wide-ranging effects because drugs are not particularly subtle in the way they affect neurotransmitter systems, you might decide you could do very well for yourself engineering a drug so that it no longer treats the illness but still has "cosmetic" effects on wellness.

KRAMER: Right -� Drug companies probably do think that way. I think the notion that all the profit in Viagra is from treating a pathological process is absurd �- it's mostly normal aging that's being treated, or at least it's the potential to treat normal aging that has people excited.

FEED: Do you think that treating normal aging, or treating normality in general, is an okay thing for society to be pursuing?

KRAMER: This is where the moral frontier is; I don't think it's as black and white as "okay or not okay." Certainly one could argue that the risk/benefit ratio ought to be different �- one could also argue it ought to be the same -� but certainly one could argue that it should be different for giving a medicine to a "normal" person -� that is, a normal but somehow disadvantaged person �- than to a person who is ill. You might say the medicine has to be yet safer than what you would demand of a medicine given for illness. In fiddling with normality, or taking someone from one less desired normal state to a more desired normal state, you might want more evidence of safety.

When you talk about treating normal people, there are distinctions you can make. There's a distinction between giving the capacity for normal function and giving the result of normal function. I was quoted in Harper's �- and I don't know if this is right or not, but I was quoted -� saying that Viagra gives the capacity for sexual functioning, but if you just gave someone a pill that gave him an orgasm that would be different. If you just give the outcome rather than the potential for the normal function, that might raise yet another level of ethical concern. Drugs that give direct outcomes like that are often drugs of abuse.

One of the functions of Listening to Prozac was to put questions like this on the table, and I think that they are questions for general discussion by moral philosophers and ordinary citizens -� not just doctors. In particular, part of my interest in raising those questions was that they not just be answered on an ad hoc basis, person to person, in a doctor's office, but that they be addressed openly in some way.

FEED: By what kind of forum? By politicians? By internet magazines?

KRAMER: By all the general forces we have in this multidimensional culture. But I think it's important to bring this out of the doctor's office, because in the doctor's office there are two problems. One is that doctors are trained to do whatever seems best for each individual person, not so much to take into account the needs of the whole culture. Doctors tend to be less worried about these moral issues because in most cases they believe -� and I would often say this in the clinical moment �- that what looks like a moral crisis is very often a result of incomplete information. That is, if you really knew more about the person and the degree of the person's suffering, and you knew more about the medicine and so on, you would quickly come to some practical conclusion that did not seem terribly fraught morally. But there might be other important considerations besides what's best for the patient.

You see this conflict in the tension between doctors and HMOs: part of the stress between doctors and HMOs is over bad care, but part of it is over distribution of care, which is the kind of issue that doesn't face doctors when they're in their office with a patient. There are secondary societal concerns in this interaction that the doctor is probably not supposed to be involved with -� the doctor's job is just to reduce the suffering and enhance the functioning of the person in front of him or her, not to decide who gets care and who doesn't. So the point is that if we leave the hard decisions about when to use drugs to doctors and patients, some of the societal concerns might get lost. That's one issue.

The other issue is bad doctors. To protect patients, you want rules from the outside that are carefully and interestingly developed, with all possible dimensions taken into account -� the individual person in the office, the implicit competition in the culture that might drive people towards drugs, the potential for drug abuse, and so on.

FEED: You see this problem with diet drugs -- shady doctors are going into business prescribing drugs through the mail or over the internet to patients they've never met.

KRAMER: Right. I think the interaction of capitalism and medicine has become particularly worrisome, between the drug companies wanting to make money and entrepreneurial corporations being health care providers. You have some need for an outside discussion of just what the indications for using a medication are.

FEED: Psychiatry has medication as a tool for treating mental illness, but it also has psychotherapy. I suppose that in practice you'd probably want to take advantage of both to treat a patient, but let's think about a thought experiment where both drugs and therapy are effective: if you accept the notion that both treatments are working on the brain, because the brain is the seat of whatever illness there is, can you differentiate in any way between the two ways of attacking the same physiological problem?

KRAMER: This is a question I've put before moral philosophers and debated with them. If you had the same outcome, if you knew that you would alter the brain in essentially similar ways, is there reason to prefer psychotherapy over pharmacotherapy? I don't think the question is ever the other way around, by the way -� people don't tend to think pharmacotherapy is morally better. So the question is: is there some advantage to struggling with yourself, curing yourself through self-awareness? Of course, it's not clear that psychotherapy really works through self-awareness or insight, and other types of psychotherapy aren't even designed to work through insight �- they may work through support, etc. But you can still pose the question: is there just some alienating quality inherent in a therapeutic interaction that involves medication, as opposed to that intimate interaction of psychotherapy? I ask that question as someone who aesthetically favors psychotherapy over pharmacotherapy, as probably most psychiatrists of my generation do, and I don't know that there is an especially good answer.

I think there are some answers to be had, though �- I'm actively working on this issue. I've mostly moved on to other topics in my writing, but the one piece of the Listening to Prozac story that I haven't let go of over the years is this question of whether there's any basis for preferring psychotherapy over pharmacotherapy. Or is the preference largely a preference for suffering -� that is, is part of the attraction of psychotherapy that it doesn't work so well? Perhaps psychotherapy just leaves people with enough melancholy for us to be comfortable with them. To some degree I think we as a culture value melancholy, although a great deal of the philosophy that supports the virtues of alienation is really written by depressives for depressives.

FEED: What about the case where someone is a little bit upset, maybe in a funk for a couple weeks, but they are the sort of person who doesn't want to see a psychiatrist or the thought of seeing a psychiatrist simply wouldn't occur to them. They may take some change in their behavior or do something on their own that might be considered an analogue of psychotherapy, in that it causes changes in experience that impact the neural substrates of emotion, and as a result the person's mood improves and they get better. Or, this person could achieve the same thing with drugs. Is there a difference between the two ways of getting the same result, or between this case and the one where the patient is clearly ill?

KRAMER: I think as you create different scenarios you see that there are a number of factors we use to judge them. One is the way we value the ailment -� that is, we may value melancholy or alienation even though at the same time we consider it handicapping. Another is time course -� maybe we think things that work slowly are preferential to things that work fast. Another is an anthropological assessment of the substance or intervention being used, so if you said to me, "You know, a change in your diet to have more protein and less carbohydrates really will make you feel more at ease," that sort of intervention I think we're very comfortable with. If we think, well maybe it's a diet deficiency, or maybe it's alienation from the lifestyle of Paleolithic man, we're comfortable with that. It turns out there are subtle aesthetic and moral attributions we give to every stage in the process of analyzing these scenarios, so that the final ethical calculus is based on a number of aesthetic choices. The particular case of very rapid drug treatment for very minor and ordinary degrees of unhappiness I think we consider very disturbing, whereas a slow psychotherapy that's successful for impulsive aggressivity �- that would be on the end of the spectrum where you'd say, hey, that's admirable, that person has struggled to overcome his violent tendencies.

Read on for Part Two: The Future of Psychopharmacology